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Abstract
The production of transnational knowledge that is widely recognized as legitimate is 
a major source of influence for international organizations. To reinforce their expert 
status, international organizations increasingly produce global benchmarks that 
measure national performance across a range of issue areas. This article illustrates 
how international organization benchmarking is a significant source of indirect power in 
world politics by examining two prominent cases in which international organizations 
seek to shape the world through comparative metrics: (1) the World Bank–International 
Finance Corporation Ease of Doing Business ranking; and (2) the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index. We 
argue that the legitimacy attached to these benchmarks because of the expertise of the 
international organizations that produce them is highly problematic for two reasons. 
First, both benchmarks oversimplify the evaluation of relative national performance, 
misrepresenting contested political values drawn from a specific transnational paradigm 
as empirical facts. Second, they entrench an arbitrary division in the international arena 
between ‘ideal’ and ‘pathological’ types of national performance, which (re)produces 
social hierarchies among states. We argue that the ways in which international 
organizations use benchmarking to orient how political actors understand best practices, 
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advocate policy changes and attribute political responsibility thus constitutes ‘bad 
science’. Extending research on processes of paradigm maintenance and the influence 
of international organizations as teachers of norms or judges of norm compliance, we 
show how the indirect power that international organizations exercise as evaluators of 
relative national performance through benchmarking can be highly consequential for the 
definition of states’ policy priorities.
Keywords
Business regulation, foreign direct investment, global benchmarking, global governance, 
indirect power, international organizations
Introduction
Since the turn of the century, there has been an unprecedented expansion in the use of 
benchmarking as a governing strategy across all areas of social and economic life in a 
growing number of countries. At the same time as benchmarking has become a core tool 
of domestic regulation, transnational actors have increasingly produced ratings and rank-
ings to assess relative national performance at the global level. Benchmarks have become 
integral to the comparative evaluation of countries’ institutional design, policy agendas 
and behaviour across issue areas as diverse as global development goals (Clegg, 2015), 
climate change action (Kuzemko, 2015), corruption (Baumann, 2017), human security 
(Homolar, 2015), international human rights norms (Harrison and Sekalala, 2015), 
national economic policies and institutions (Sending and Lie, 2015), political freedom 
(Bush, forthcoming), and poverty reduction (Freistein, 2016). Global benchmarks based 
on country rankings are deceptively easy to communicate and consume around the world.
Consistent with the rise of benchmarking, International Relations scholars have 
recently begun to direct attention to the politics of utilizing comparative national perfor-
mance metrics (Hansen and Mühlen-Schulte, 2012; Mügge, 2016). Within this emerging 
research agenda, work has focused on how — and to what extent — benchmarks directly 
influence the behaviour of target states (Cooley and Snyder, 2015), as well as how bench-
marking practices draw on and reinforce existing transnational policy paradigms and 
dominant discourse (Broome and Quirk, 2015a; Fougner, 2008). This article contributes 
to such research by providing a conceptual critique of the production and dissemination 
of comparative national performance metrics by prominent international organizations 
(IOs). We connect the global governance role that IOs play in measuring and evaluating 
relative national performance to two strands of earlier research on how IOs seek to shape 
standards of ‘best practice’: (1) work on IOs as teachers of norms (Finnemore, 1993; 
Jacoby, 2001); and (2) work on IOs as judges of norm compliance (Hafner-Burton, 2008; 
Sharman, 2009). IOs were pioneers in developing benchmarks in the early 1990s, and of 
the more than 200 new global benchmarks that were created from 2000 to 2015, at least 
40 were established by IOs (Global Benchmarking Database, 2017). Our emphasis on 
IOs as evaluators is in contrast to existing works in International Relations, which ana-
lyse benchmarking practices either as a general trend among different categories of trans-
national actors (Cooley and Snyder, 2015; see also Broome and Quirk, 2015b; Merry 
Broome et al. 3
et al., 2015), or focus on a single benchmark that has been retrospectively identified as 
influencing state behaviour (Kelley and Simmons, 2015).
In this article, we explore how comparative performance metrics produced by IOs 
continue to be plagued by two problems that create and reproduce distorted images of the 
world. First, input factors differ far more than the methodologies used in the design of 
global benchmarks imply. Countries have vastly divergent structural positions (in both 
political and economic terms) and are endowed with sharply uneven capacities to imple-
ment domestic policies or to exercise international agency over global rules and policy 
norms. These differences tend to be glossed over in the process of operationalizing key 
concepts of national performance. Second, outputs often differ far less than the league 
tables portrayed in IO benchmarks indicate. Especially when they are produced in the 
form of rankings, benchmarks commonly exaggerate differences in performance between 
countries, obscuring a high degree of similarity in institutional forms and performance 
outcomes within country clusters (Høyland et al., 2012).
As these related input and output problems tend to be swept under the carpet by the 
political agents that produce and utilize them, IO benchmarks receive more scientific 
credibility than they deserve. We argue in this article that IO benchmarking is often trou-
bled by questionable methodology and data collection biases because the use of transna-
tional knowledge by IOs to produce global benchmarks cannot be separated from 
political values and policy reform preferences. Consequently, rather than underwriting 
the role they claim as ‘truth-tellers’ to their member states, through benchmarking, IOs 
help to maintain existing transnational policy paradigms and to legitimate existing hier-
archies in world politics. Power relations are thus an inherent feature of the ‘bad science’ 
of IO benchmarking exercises. As the article demonstrates, benchmarks are a key source 
of indirect power for IOs to shape world politics according to their image of best practice 
in a given issue area, connecting their organizational expertise to the identification of 
‘ideal’ and ‘pathological’ models of state policy and performance.
The article proceeds as follows. First, we build on the existing literature that empha-
sizes the workings of indirect power in order to establish the importance of understand-
ing the role that IOs play as evaluators in world politics. We then expand on the 
conceptualization of the effects of IO benchmarking through a discussion of two empiri-
cal cases of IO benchmarking: (1) the World Bank–International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) Ease of Doing Business (EDB) ranking1; and (2) the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index (FDI 
Index). In each example, we show how the benchmark does not deserve its reputation as 
an aggregation of neutral observations of national progress in a given issue area. Instead, 
both suffer from construct and content validity problems because they lack a scientific 
basis for how they operationalize highly political concepts into what are perceived as 
objective, value-neutral categories. In the final section, we discuss how IO benchmark-
ing functions as a mechanism of paradigm maintenance by promoting oversimplified 
images of the world as split between ideal and pathological forms of state policy and 
performance. Despite containing significant methodological problems and representing 
contested policy ideas as best practices, IO benchmarks achieve legitimacy — and 
thereby policy traction — by piggybacking on the status of the organizations that pro-
duce them as expert evaluators.
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IOs as evaluators of national performance
IOs wield power over other political actors both directly and indirectly. Until recently, 
most International Relations scholarship on how IOs shape world politics has focused on 
identifying and explaining how they are able to exercise direct power over states, primar-
ily through carrot-and-stick approaches and the resolution of information problems. 
Within this literature, IOs are seen as influential if they are institutionally mandated and 
endowed with sufficient resources to organize bailouts for distressed economies, to coor-
dinate crisis management policies or development financing, and to impose loan condi-
tionality (Lütz and Kranke, 2014; Moschella, 2016; Nelson, 2014; Park and Strand, 
2016). Research has also shown that IOs can exercise direct power over states by moni-
toring and enforcing compliance with international agreements (Simmons, 2000), as 
well as by directing and sponsoring capacity-building programmes that encompass inter-
national policy training and technical assistance initiatives (Broome and Seabrooke, 
2015). Related work locates additional sources of direct IO influence in their mandated 
surveillance on behalf of member states (Lombardi and Woods, 2008), policy reform 
advice to national elites (Fang and Stone, 2012), and external approval of key policy set-
tings (Hinterleitner et al., 2016).
Channels of institutional influence in global governance stretch far beyond the visible 
sets of formal relations between transnational actors and national policymakers. International 
Relations scholarship has begun to pay greater attention to the ability of political agents to 
exercise ‘indirect control over the conditions of action of socially distant others’ (Barnett 
and Duvall, 2005: 48), even though these dynamics are often harder to observe and specify 
than more direct forms of coercion (see Figure 1). In our investigation of how IOs shape 
policy agendas and preferences through benchmarking, we directly speak to such scholar-
ship, adding to two key research strands on the indirect power of IOs in world politics.
The first body of scholarship focuses on transnational socialization processes and pro-
vides insights into how IOs can serve as teachers of norms to states. This approach estab-
lishes IOs as institutional actors who are not only able to socialize policy elites into a 
common framework of understanding in a given issue area (Finnemore, 1993; Jacoby, 
2001), but also foster ‘diagnostic coordination’ in how policy problems are defined and 
acted upon as policymakers move along ‘policy curves’ (Broome and Seabrooke, 2015). 
The second body of scholarship centres on the role of stigma, showing that some IOs func-
tion as judges that impose reputational costs on countries that fail to comply with interna-
tional norms through stigmatization. Such forms of ‘shaming’ can occur through the 
blacklisting of states deemed to have violated particular normative standards, which both 
imposes a reputational sanction and triggers incentives for compliance (Hafner-Burton, 
2008; Sharman, 2009). The explicit use or implicit threat of shaming provides IOs with a 
valuable tool for enforcing international norms, especially if stigmatization produces 
knock-on effects for aid flows, foreign investment or sovereign credit ratings (Chwieroth, 
2015). We build on and extend these literatures on the indirect power of IOs by focusing on 
how IOs serve as evaluators of national performance via global benchmarking. As with 
socialization and stigmatization processes, the evaluative role that IOs play as benchmark-
ers can also serve as a mechanism of ‘paradigm maintenance’ (Wade, 1996) by delineating 
what does and does not count as legitimate transnational knowledge.
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The notion that IOs exercise agential power through knowledge practices is consistent 
with existing constructivist literature in International Relations. Such scholarship has 
shown that their expert status and ‘cognitive authority’ helps IOs: to turn policy develop-
ments into governable issues, diffuse political ideas and set policy agendas (Broome and 
Seabrooke, 2012; Clegg, 2010; Hülsse, 2007); to validate and promote emergent norms 
(Park and Vetterlein, 2010; Weaver, 2008); and to develop, maintain and adapt transna-
tional policy paradigms (Babb, 2013; Ban, 2016; Broad, 2006; Wade, 1996).
Indirect power frequently works through disciplinary dynamics that are far subtler 
than the ‘sticks’ of threats, sanctions or delegation. It is conceptualized here as relations 
that are rooted in the formation and control of what bodies of knowledge become 
accepted, or what counts, in Pierre Bourdieu’s (1989: 20) words, as ‘the legitimate vision 
of the world’. Based on this specific understanding of indirect power, we argue that IO 
benchmarks create meaning through knowledge-based articulations of the problems fac-
ing national officials and through the designation of countries’ standing relative to their 
peers, which establishes social hierarchies of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ performers. Such hierar-
chies connect the promotion of international norms with social pressure on states to 
conform to these standards of behaviour and policy design (Towns and Rumelili, 2017). 
We refer to the best practice model that a global comparative performance metric pro-
duces as an ‘image’: ‘Like a photographic image, it foregrounds a particular aspect of the 
world and excludes others’ (Fry and O’Hagan, 2000: 5; see also Hansen, 2011).
The country evaluations produced by IOs can be expected to carry greater weight than 
those produced by more openly partisan actors or cause-oriented organizations. The 
expert status that prominent IOs have achieved through their mandate and track record 
— backed by institutional resources in terms of expert human capital and combined with 
an organizational culture that privileges accepted positivist methodologies in knowledge 
production — enhances their influence in transnational policy debates. As a rich schol-
arly literature has already demonstrated, the most prominent IOs often seek to cultivate 
their standing among their respective audiences as ‘truth-tellers’ that can cut through the 
Figure 1. Direct and indirect expressions of IO power.
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logjam of national interests, partisan differences and domestic veto-players by appealing 
to the rational-scientific basis of their policy knowledge and advice (Barnett and 
Finnemore, 2004; Béland and Orenstein, 2013; Broad, 2006; Broome and Seabrooke, 
2012; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012; Kramarz and Momani, 2013). Recent case-study research 
suggests that IOs are perceived by citizens as having greater credibility than national 
governments in reporting on relative national performance, even when they are provid-
ing the same information (James and Petersen, 2017).
The expert authority with which IOs construct ratings and rankings of national perfor-
mance therefore differs from other producers of global benchmarks, such as civil society 
organizations, market actors and states. Unlike activist organizations, IOs enjoy greater 
resources to exercise political leverage and benefit from an official mandate for action in 
a specified policy domain. Unlike market actors, IOs use benchmarks not for commercial 
gain, but to shape policy conversations and political agendas. Finally, unlike states, IOs 
do not pursue national interests by using benchmarks as a tool of foreign policy, which 
links indirect power to direct coercion. In contrast to these other types of benchmark 
producers, IOs rely more heavily on the recognition of their role as expert producers of 
transnational knowledge to gain public attention and policy traction.
IO benchmarking in practice
IO benchmarks often enjoy a reputation as science-based metrics of comparative national 
performance that are removed from the political contests characteristic of many transna-
tional processes. Despite the high degree of credibility assigned to them, as we will show, 
IO benchmarks suffer from construct and content validity problems that create distorted 
representations of the quality of country performance. Construct validity refers to 
whether the evaluation techniques used to construct a global benchmark effectively 
measure what they purport to measure, in particular: how effectively key concepts are 
defined, operationalized and weighted as a set of variables; whether consistent and high-
quality cross-national data are available; and whether the various types of source mate-
rial used are equally robust and internally coherent, which is especially challenging in 
the case of composite benchmarks. In short, construct validity concerns the degree of 
ontological fit between measurement techniques and empirical objectives. Content valid-
ity refers to whether the scope of a benchmark provides adequate coverage of the multi-
ple dimensions of an issue area to effectively capture and measure performance, or 
whether critical dimensions are excluded (Michener, 2015: 187, 189).
In this section, we provide empirical illustrations of how IOs rely upon their expert 
status to disseminate seemingly neutral observations of national progress in a given issue 
area. Specifically, we discuss two benchmarks each of which is produced by a well-
resourced IO that enjoys high prestige as a creator and disseminator of transnational 
policy knowledge: the EDB ranking and the FDI Index. We selected these two bench-
marks from the Global Benchmarking Database (2017), an online repository of 275 
global benchmarks that we created and continue to expand.2 Our rationale was to select 
benchmarks that differ in their core attributes, instead of choosing benchmarks from the 
same issue area or those produced by different categories of actors, as is common in 
recent comparative studies (see Michener, 2015). The cases differ along the following 
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lines: what issue area they cover; whether they evaluate statutory regulations or perfor-
mance outcomes; whether they translate the results into ratings (scores) or country rank-
ings; what type of source material they use; how many countries they cover; and how 
much media attention they receive (see Table 1). The focus on IO benchmarks with dif-
ferent core attributes not only draws attention to the methodological limitations of bench-
marks in a specific issue area, but also highlights the common factors at play in how 
different IOs use benchmarks as instruments of indirect power.
The World Bank–IFC EDB ranking
Few IO benchmarks have gained as much attention and generated as much controversy 
as the EDB ranking of the local business environment for small- and medium-sized pri-
vate sector firms in World Bank member states. The benchmark has been published 
annually since 2006 as a core component of the flagship World Bank–IFC Doing Business 
report. The explicit foundation of the Doing Business report is the assumption that eco-
nomic activity benefits from ‘Rules that set out and clarify property rights and facilitate 
the resolution of disputes … [a]nd ... that enhance the predictability of economic interac-
tions’ (World Bank, 2016: 13). The report traces reform trajectories around the world, 
showcasing the ‘big strides in business regulation’ achieved ‘in every region’ and prais-
ing the ‘most improved’ countries (World Bank, 2015: 16, 35–53). Countries with a 
higher (= better) year-on-year aggregate score are highlighted with an upward arrow in 
the ranking, while the rankings are accompanied by short country reform summaries, 
which can additionally signal what each country has done well or badly since the previ-
ous ranking with a tick or a cross, respectively. However, positions at the top and bottom 
of the rankings tend to remain stable over time, as Table 2 illustrates.
The EDB ranking encompasses 10 categories of economic governance that are used 
to measure the quality of the regulatory environment in each economy, focusing on the 
regulation of small- and medium-sized enterprises. The data are based on survey ques-
tionnaire responses from over 12,500 legal experts and business consultants in the 190 
countries included in the report. The 10 categories of business regulation assessed to 
produce the ranking are: (1) ‘starting a business’; (2) ‘dealing with construction permits’; 
(3) ‘getting electricity’; (4) ‘registering property’; (5) ‘getting credit’; (6) ‘protecting 
Table 1. Selected benchmark characteristics.
EDB ranking FDI Index
Producer World Bank–International 
Finance Corporation
Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development
Issue area Business environment Investment regulation
Evaluation target Statutory regulations Statutory regulations
Results format Country rankings Country ratings (scores)
Source material Large-N expert survey Review of statutory regulations
Coverage 190 countries 62 countries
Media attention High Low
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minority investors’; (7) ‘paying taxes’; (8) ‘trading across borders’; (9) ‘enforcing con-
tracts’; and (10) ‘resolving insolvency’. The Doing Business report also includes indica-
tors on labour market regulation, but these have been excluded from the EDB ranking 
since 2011 following criticism from the International Labour Organization, the 
International Trade Union Confederation and other bodies of the validity of the ‘employ-
ing workers’ indicator and the causal assumptions that underpinned it (Lee et al., 2008). 
Reflecting the free market principle that labour markets work best with minimal protec-
tions for workers, in EDB rankings prior to Doing Business 2008, the ‘employing work-
ers’ indicator ranked countries more positively based on how easy it was to dismiss 
workers, while restrictions on night work, such as overtime pay and scheduling of work 
hours limitations, were classified as ‘rigidities’, which received more negative scores 
(World Bank, 2017a). Index scores for each of the 10 individual components of the 
benchmark are produced through expert assessments of the legal context and procedures 
in each country, after these aspects have been analysed by World Bank–IFC officials and 
checked against statutory rules and regulations.
The EDB ranking is widely cited as ‘an authoritative and credible outside judge’ of a 
country’s business environment (Cooley, 2015: 1) and receives substantial press 
Table 2. Top 10 and bottom 10 listings in the EDB ranking, 2015–2017.
2015 2016 2017
Top 10 
countries
Singapore (1) Singapore (1) New Zealand (1)
New Zealand (2) New Zealand (2) Singapore (2)
Hong Kong SAR, 
China (3)
Denmark (3) Denmark (3)
Denmark (4) Korea, Rep. (4) Hong Kong SAR, China (4)
Korea, Rep. (5) Hong Kong SAR, China (5) Korea, Rep. (5)
Norway (6) United Kingdom (6) Norway (6)
United States (7) United States (7) United Kingdom (7)
United Kingdom (8) Sweden (8) United States (8)
Finland (9) Norway (9) Sweden (9)
Australia (10) Finland (10) Macedonia, FYR (10)
Bottom 10 
countries
Haiti (180) Equatorial Guinea (180) Haiti (181)
Angola (181) Angola (181) Angola (182)
Venezuela, RB (182) Haiti (182) Afghanistan (183)
Afghanistan (183) Chad (183) Congo, Dem. Rep. (184)
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
(184)
Congo, Dem. Rep. (184) Central African Rep. (185)
Chad (185) Central African Rep. (185) South Sudan (186)
South Sudan (186) Venezuela, RB (186) Venezuela, RB (187)
Central African Rep. 
(187)
South Sudan (187) Libya (188)
Libya (188) Libya (188) Eritrea (189)
Eritrea (189) Eritrea (189) Somalia (190)
Source: Data retrieved from Doing Business reports, available at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/Reports
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coverage and global media attention (Davis et al., 2012: 93). According to citation data 
provided by the World Bank (2016: 24, fn. 11), from the first Doing Business volume in 
2003 to 2016, the report’s indicators have been dealt with in 2,182 peer-reviewed articles 
in academic journals and 6,296 online working papers. In addition to the high level of 
interest from journalists and academics alike, political leaders have made improving 
their countries’ EDB ranking an official objective of government policy (Besley, 2015: 
99–100).
Consider the case of Russia’s commitment to structural economic reform, which 
formed part of a larger effort by the country’s government to attract higher rates of for-
eign investment. President Vladimir Putin explicitly referenced the EDB rankings to 
signal Russia’s move towards internationally recognized standards of ‘doing business’. 
In special decrees published in May 2012, Putin announced an interim goal for Russia to 
reach 50th place in the EDB ranking by 2015, and a longer-term target of achieving 20th 
position by 2018 (Pomeranz and Smith, 2016). Putin’s interim goal was only missed by 
the narrowest of margins: the country’s position improved rapidly from its EDB ranking 
of 120th in 2012 to 112th in 2013, 92nd in 2014, 62nd in 2015, 51st in 2016 and 40th in 
2017. This substantial rise in Russia’s EDB ranking was made possible by selective lib-
eralizing reforms, through which the Russian government targeted the specific areas 
covered by the indicators used to produce the EDB ranking, specifically policy changes 
relating to ‘starting a business’, ‘getting electricity’, ‘registering property’, ‘getting 
credit’ and ‘paying taxes’ (World Bank, 2015: 179).
The value attached to the benchmark when it comes to the investment promotion 
strategy adopted by Russia’s president, as well as leaders from countries as diverse as 
India (Besley, 2015) and the Republic of Georgia (Schueth, 2015), suggests that it has 
become a symbolic marker of national status and relative economic competitiveness. As 
then-World Bank Chief Economist Kaushik Basu claimed, the EDB has achieved the 
status of ‘one of the world’s most influential policy publications’ (World Bank, 2015: iv) 
and thus carries a significant degree of expert legitimacy. In turn, the knowledge-based 
authority associated with the benchmark implies that there is a risk that IOs and other 
agencies start ‘teaching to the test’ to obtain policy adjustments only in the specific areas 
covered by the EDB indicators. The EDB ranking thus constrains the space for tailoring 
reform proposals to individual countries’ needs: it places a penalty on fostering the 
development of innovative policy alternatives that lie outside the ‘EDB box’ and that do 
not reflect the neoliberal policy paradigm at the heart of the conceptual categories used 
to construct the ranking.
For the World Bank and the IFC, the EDB ranking provides a powerful symbolic 
instrument that establishes a hierarchy of regulatory shortcomings across countries, as 
well as shaping policy conversations and guiding officials towards what are presented as 
optimal policy reforms. In a 2008 official evaluation of the quality and effects of the 
indicators used to produce the EDB ranking by the Independent Evaluation Group (2008: 
43), the World Bank Group’s semi-independent watchdog, staff maintained that ‘Ranking 
with peers provides incentives for reforms, not the survey itself’. While the benchmark 
‘scores economies based on how business friendly their regulatory systems are’ (World 
Bank, 2016: 5), there is significant scope for ‘inadequate’ regulation (based on a limited 
number of restrictions) to be conflated with more ‘efficient’ regulation (Independent 
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Evaluation Group, 2008: 32). The image of the economy articulated in the Doing 
Business report thus represents regulation as a burden on business and a constraint on 
economic growth, which should be reduced to a minimum. This naturalization of a par-
ticular conception of a liberal market economy as an organizational ideal marginalizes 
considerations of alternative policy practices and goals via a narrow focus on regulatory 
design for the purpose of enabling business freedom.
Since the 2015 edition, the EDB ranking has been obtained through the calculation of 
a novel ‘distance to frontier’ score, which aims to benchmark countries against regula-
tory ‘best practice’. The score expresses the difference in performance for each country 
compared with the best performance recorded by any country in each of the 10 sets of 
Doing Business indicators since 2005, or the third year in which data have been collected 
for indicators introduced after 2005. Distance to frontier scores range from 0 (the ‘worst 
performance’) to 100 (‘the frontier’, or best recorded performance). The 10 distance to 
frontier scores for each set of indicators are aggregated into a simple average to produce 
an overall distance to frontier score for each country (World Bank, 2016: 167).
While the World Bank (2016: 164) claims that ‘The distance to frontier score captures 
the gap between an economy’s performance and a measure of best practice’, it analytically 
privileges fewer and cheaper restrictions as ideal ‘best practice’. For example, New 
Zealand ‘set the frontier’ for two of the four ‘starting a business’ indicators, with an over-
all distance to frontier score in 2017 of 99.96. New Zealand requires only one procedure 
for starting a business, which can be completed in half a day at low cost (calculated at 
0.3% of income per capita with no minimum requirement for paid-in capital) (World 
Bank, 2016: 165, 228). The country that scored worst on this indicator in 2017 is the 
Central African Republic, with a distance to frontier score of 31.36. The Central African 
Republic requires 10 procedures for starting a business, taking 22 days to complete at 
significant cost (calculated at 209.4% of income per capita, with a minimum paid-in capi-
tal requirement of 556.6% of income per capita) (World Bank, 2016: 198).
The calculation of distance to frontier scores is underpinned by the neoliberal assump-
tion that less intrusive regulations and lighter compliance costs for business are an effec-
tive and legitimate measure of economic efficiency. This serves as a form of paradigm 
maintenance by determining the yardstick with which national policy performance is 
evaluated. Distance to frontier scores also help to reveal how ordinal rankings can distort 
images of national performance. Figure 2 shows how the overall distance to frontier 
scores for many Group of Twenty (G20) countries are closely clustered. The 10 ‘best’ 
G20 countries received distance to frontier scores in Doing Business 2017 that ranged 
from 84.07–72.29, indicating that the G20 country in 10th position was less than 12 per-
centage points behind the top G20 country in terms of the ‘regulatory frontier’ parameter. 
Once these same scores are converted into an ordinal ranking, however, the results imply 
a greater degree of variation across countries, ranging from 5th place (Korea) to 47th 
(Mexico).
The image of the world articulated in the EDB ranking reproduces contested ideals 
underlying World Bank assessments in country operations as value-neutral measure-
ments of business regulations when it comes to assigning political responsibility. These 
evaluations assume: that national policies, not international structures, determine the 
quality of local business environments; that ‘excessive’ regulation of business impairs 
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growth; and that international economic integration is beneficial for domestic economic 
performance in all circumstances. The EDB ranking likewise advocates domestic dereg-
ulation as a panacea and locates the need for political change solely at the domestic level, 
where stubborn policymakers and slow bureaucrats are construed as obstructing the 
long-overdue move towards economic liberalization. The EDB ranking is thus used as a 
means to assert the authority of the World Bank Group over economic and development 
policy challenges within a neoliberal policy paradigm, while constraining the scope for 
debating, designing and defending alternative national policy changes.
Nevertheless, the EDB ranking has not been universally accepted as a legitimate 
expert assessment of countries’ local business environment. Scholars have identified a 
range of conceptual omissions and methodological flaws in the EDB ranking, especially 
relating to the contentious issue of labour market regulation (Benjamin et al., 2010: 79–
87; Berg and Cazes, 2008; Lee et al., 2008: 420–426). The EDB ranking has also received 
substantial criticism from a global coalition of civil society organizations, which saw the 
benchmarking exercise as undermining the World Bank’s broader credibility (Stichelmans, 
2014). In light of these criticisms, two official reviews of the Doing Business report have 
lent support to proposals that the EDB ranking either needs to be significantly reformed 
(Independent Evaluation Group, 2008: 54) or perhaps even abandoned entirely 
(Independent Doing Business Report Review Panel, 2013: 4).
Due to these significant conceptual and methodological weaknesses, the EDB ranking 
conveys ‘misleading policy messages that invite simplistic and potentially erroneous 
policy conclusions’ (Berg and Cazes, 2008: 350). In addition to its methodological 
Figure 2. Doing Business 2017 aggregate scores/rankings for G20 countries.
Source: World Bank (2016).
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limitations, the EDB ranking serves as a source of rhetorical legitimation for a neoliberal 
policy paradigm, based on the evaluation of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ models of national perfor-
mance using measurements and indicators that privilege free market principles. From the 
World Bank’s perspective, however, the benchmark helps to promote the organization’s 
broader aim of encouraging countries to more closely mirror the image of the world 
represented in the EDB ranking. This image of business freedom promotes a particular-
istic conception of a ‘good’ economy as one characterized by minimal public grip on the 
actions of private businesses. Like other development indicators produced by the World 
Bank, such as the international poverty line measure and income per capita country cat-
egories, the EDB ranking defines the identities of countries by means of ‘a hierarchical 
order in which some of them are placed above the others’ (Uribe, 2015: 138).
The EDB ranking thus presents and promotes a very particular image of the world, 
one in which political debates about regulatory reform are restricted to determining the 
operational priorities of the supply side of national economies. What business freedom 
from regulatory burdens means for different groups of workers and consumers, and the 
wider political ramifications that emerge from different ways of governing business 
activities, is precluded. The distributional effects and political consequences of restric-
tive or lax regulatory standards are ultimately irrelevant to a standard focal point for 
institutional and policy reforms: reduction of regulatory ‘red tape’ and economic liberali-
zation in line with an ideal that endorses competition as the primary or sole means to 
generate economic and social progress (see Elias, 2013). Although business regulations 
may be used to shield a weak economy from external volatility, to constrain predatory 
business practices or to pursue broader developmental goals, these possibilities are not 
accounted for.
The OECD FDI Index
Many IO benchmarks aim primarily at capturing the attention of elite actors in specialist 
policymaking fields, and seldom make front-page headlines or generate widespread civil 
society attention. An ideal-typical IO benchmark that targets a politically salient issue 
area but gains relatively little publicity is the OECD’s FDI Index, which aims to measure 
how restrictive countries’ statutory rules are on foreign direct investment (FDI). The FDI 
Index was established in 2003 to comparatively measure the restrictiveness of FDI rules 
on an occasional basis, and is jointly produced by the OECD Investment Division and 
the OECD Economics Department. Initially created for the years 1997, 2003 and 2006, 
it has been released annually since 2010. The number of countries assessed by the FDI 
Index has gradually expanded from 44 to 62. In its current format, it covers all G20 coun-
tries and current OECD members, as well as non-OECD adherents to the OECD’s 
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.
The 2003 version of the FDI Index measured ‘restrictiveness’ across nine sectors, 
calculating country scores based on a weighted average for sector scores from FDI and 
trade flow data (Golub, 2003: 93, 113). A modified 2006 version with adjusted industry 
scores measured essentially the same nine sectors weighted by the sectoral composition 
of overall inward FDI and trade flows for OECD countries (Koyama and Golub, 2006: 
14). While the earlier versions of the FDI Index covered four secondary and five tertiary 
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economic sectors, the 2010 revision of the classificatory system expanded its scope to 
incorporate four primary, seven secondary and 10 tertiary economic sectors plus real 
estate. These 22 equally weighted sectors are split into four dimensions of restrictions on 
FDI: (1) ‘foreign equity limitations’; (2) ‘screening or prior approval mechanisms’; (3) 
‘restrictions on the employment of foreigners as key personnel’; and (4) ‘operational 
restrictions’, such as restrictions on landownership and the repatriation of capital. The 
restrictiveness of countries’ policy measures are assessed using indicators linked to the 
standards enshrined in the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements (Kalinova 
et al., 2010: 6).
Based on an assessment of policy measures included within these four dimensions, a 
country receives a score with three decimal places on a scale from 0 (= ‘open’) to 1 (= 
‘closed’) for each of the 22 economic sectors. To create an overall rating, the individual 
scores are translated into a simple average across sectors, with each sector equally 
weighted. The shift away from using sector scores weighted by FDI and trade flows 
towards a simple average removed the relationship between the individual sectors and 
global economic dynamics. This seemingly minor change in methodology in 2010 had a 
significant impact upon the scores for some countries, especially those with large pri-
mary industry sectors. For example, New Zealand saw its overall score worsen from 
0.170 in 2006 (when it was rated as the 28th most open to FDI) to 0.263 in 2010 (the 
42nd most open to FDI), largely as a consequence of foreign equity restrictions in fisher-
ies and other restrictions in primary industries in the country.
Unlike many IO benchmarks, the FDI Index does not produce a formal ranking of coun-
tries’ scores, but merely presents countries’ aggregate ratings in alphabetical order. The 
FDI Index therefore avoids the methodological problem of artificially inflating the differ-
ences between countries’ positions through visual representations of comparative perfor-
mance, such as league tables and heat maps (Broome and Quirk, 2017), which plague 
many other ordinal rankings of national performance. Nevertheless, the country ratings 
assigned in the FDI Index establish a clear hierarchy when it comes to investment restric-
tions among the countries, which centres on representing fewer policy restrictions on for-
eign investment as ideal and promoting the objective of increasing the process of 
liberalization over time. Moreover, the scores can be manually translated into a ranking 
with ease. Table 3 shows that, of the two IO benchmarks examined here, the OECD’s FDI 
Index exhibits a greater degree of stability in the top and the bottom 10 positions over time.
Like the EDB ranking, the FDI Index purports to measure objective national perfor-
mance but is based on contested assumptions about the benefits of open markets and the 
pathologies of economic regulation. As investment regulations that do not grant foreign 
capital the same market access conditions enjoyed by domestic firms are framed nega-
tively as restrictions, the FDI Index represents a national economy that is open to inter-
national investment flows as the ideal. The average score across the 35 OECD member 
states in 2016 was only 0.067, indicating an almost complete absence of restrictions on 
FDI. Rising economic powers scored significantly higher, indicating a greater reliance 
on controls to restrict such inflows; for example, Brazil scored 0.101, Russia 0.187 and 
India 0.212. China received one of the highest scores (signalling greater restrictiveness) 
of the 62 countries rated in 2016, with 0.327 (OECD, 2017). As market analysts have 
noted, however, there is no automatic correlation between the restrictiveness of 
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countries’ investment rules and actual FDI inflows (Garry, 2013). The case of China 
provides an apt illustration here. Despite receiving the second worst score in the 2014 
FDI Index, in the same year, the country reached the status of being ‘the world’s largest 
recipient of FDI’ (UNCTAD, 2015: ix).
Furthermore, the FDI Index cannot capture differences in the implementation and 
enforcement of statutory restrictions across countries, nor does it measure ‘the nature of 
corporate governance, the extent of state ownership, and institutional or informal restric-
tions’, or sub-national policies (Kalinova et al., 2010: 6, 9). Thus, the FDI Index merely 
constructs an image of countries’ openness to international economic integration and 
gauges how close their policies come to the OECD’s ideal type of an open economy; it is 
not a measure of national success in attracting foreign investment or of the degree of 
international economic integration per se.
The classification and coverage of different economic sectors in the FDI Index pro-
motes an image of the ideal economy as one that is almost entirely free from statutory 
restrictions on FDI. To perform well in the FDI Index, countries need to have designed a 
national regulatory framework according to this image, with negative implications for 
Table 3. Top 10 and bottom 10 listings in the FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index, 2014–
2016.
2014 2015 2016
Top 10 
countries
Luxembourg (1) Luxembourg (1) Luxembourg (1)
Portugal (2) Portugal (2) Portugal (2)
Slovenia (2) Slovenia (2) Slovenia (2)
Romania (4) Romania (4) Romania (4)
Czech Republic (5) Czech Republic (5) Czech Republic (5)
Netherlands (6) Netherlands (6) Netherlands (6)
Estonia (7) Estonia (7) Estonia (7)
Finland (8) Finland (8) Finland (8)
Spain (9) Spain (9) Spain (9)
Germany (10) Germany (10) Germany (10)
Bottom 10 
countries
Tunisia (50) Tunisia (50) Tunisia (53)
Malaysia (51) Malaysia (51) Malaysia (54)
New Zealand (52) India (52) India (55)
India (53) New Zealand (53) New Zealand (56)
Jordan (54) Jordan (54) Jordan (57)
Indonesia (55) Indonesia (55) Indonesia (58)
Myanmar (56) Saudi Arabia (56) China, People’s Rep. (59)
Saudi Arabia (57) Myanmar (57) Myanmar (60)
China, People’s Rep. (58) China, People’s Rep. (58) Saudi Arabia (61)
Philippines (59) Philippines (59) Philippines (62)
Note: While the FDI Index does not rank countries the numerical scores produce a hierarchy of performance.
Source: Data retrieved from OECD website, available at: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode 
=FDIINDEX#
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countries that may prefer policy alternatives. In a fashion similar to the EDB ranking, the 
FDI Index privileges an image of business freedom — in this case, the equitable treat-
ment of foreign investors and domestic businesses — which encourages countries to 
gradually converge towards the OECD member state average at the very bottom of the 
0–1 scale of FDI openness, based on the principle of ‘progressive liberalization’ 
(Williams, 2008: 125). For the purposes of composing the FDI Index, any policy meas-
ure that discriminates between foreign and domestic investors counts as a restriction 
(Kalinova et al., 2010: 6). Policy alternatives to a liberalized foreign investment regime, 
which may offer important benefits for a country’s economic performance and develop-
ment trajectory, are classified as aberrations from the norm. The implicit assumption 
promoted through the IO benchmark is that such policies harm economic growth and 
development, which results in bad scores.
Overall, then, the FDI Index rests on a division between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ foreign 
investment rules. This analytical approach contributes to the maintenance of a transna-
tional policy paradigm that is centred on the assumed benefits of unrestricted capital 
mobility for economic growth. Its purpose is to identify statutory barriers to investment 
across a wide range of policy areas encompassing primary (agriculture), secondary 
(manufacturing) and tertiary (services) industries, as well as rules on the acquisition of 
land and real estate investment. This binary conception of countries’ rules for governing 
foreign investment supplements the OECD’s general promotion, not least through the 
1989 amendment to its Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements, of capital mobility 
for both long-term and short-term investments (Abdelal, 2006: 14). In this image of the 
world, unfettered international capital flows offer host countries only economic benefits 
and no costs. Among other things, this image obscures the potential for transnational 
corporations to shift taxable revenue offshore through transfer-pricing practices within 
‘global wealth chains’ (Seabrooke and Wigan, 2017). The benchmark thus sidelines the 
possibility that the equitable treatment of foreign and domestic investors might instead 
grant the former a structural advantage over the latter on what is already an uneven play-
ing field.
Although references to the FDI Index are common in policy conversations, as well as 
in behind-the-scenes negotiations, it does not produce many news headlines or stir much 
controversy. Instead of high public visibility, the indirect power of the FDI Index lies in 
its widespread use by IOs and governance forums. Importantly, a range of additional 
OECD surveillance instruments make extensive use of the FDI Index, which extends the 
reach of both the benchmark and the organisation itself because it helps to disseminate 
OECD concepts and standards of ‘best practice’. For example, the FDI Index forms one 
element of the OECD Indicators of Product Market Regulation (PMR) (Kalinova et al., 
2010: 5). The PMR indicators provide international comparative measures of economy-
wide policy regimes that promote or inhibit market competition in 34 OECD and 22 non-
OECD countries (the FDI Index is used to identify barriers to investment). The PMR, in 
turn, shapes the definition of policy priorities in the flagship OECD annual publication 
Going for Growth (first published in 2005), which compares structural policy develop-
ments across OECD members, identifies desirable economic reforms and assesses national 
progress towards the adoption of recommended policy reforms from year to year. The 
Going for Growth report also forms the basis of the OECD’s multilateral assessment role 
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within G20 working groups. Specifically, it informs the OECD’s input to the G20 
Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth as well as the G20 National 
Growth Strategies, which were designed as a multilateral mechanism to pursue the goal 
of expanding economic growth by 2% by 2018 through growth-enhancing reforms and 
the monitoring of countries’ progress in achieving them (Schwanen, 2010).
In addition to the PMR indicators, the FDI Index is used in OECD Economic Surveys, 
which are conducted every two years for each OECD member state and several non-OECD 
countries. It also feeds into countries’ ‘roadmaps’ for accession to the OECD, where the 
OECD Investment Committee prepares a formal opinion on a candidate country’s invest-
ment policies, measured against OECD ‘best practice’ standards, which informs the nego-
tiation of policy reforms as part of the accession process. Finally, the FDI Index forms an 
important component of OECD Investment Policy Reviews, which the organization under-
takes in response to an official request to evaluate a country’s investment trends and poli-
cies. Multi-agency government task forces, regional economic communities such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and 
the World Bank Group and other multilateral development banks have used Investment 
Policy Reviews to shape policy reform initiatives and to signal a government’s desire to 
improve the investment climate. Figure 3 depicts a simplified illustration of the convoluted 
process whereby the transnational knowledge created by the FDI Index is disseminated 
across multiple surveillance instruments and governance forums.
Like the EDB ranking, the OECD’s FDI Index is part of a neoliberal transnational 
policy paradigm that extols the virtues of opening up the economy and reducing the regu-
latory role of the state over business activities. While global governance actors have 
promoted this broader agenda in a variety of ways (Abdelal, 2006; Ban, 2016; Kentikelenis 
et al., 2016), IO benchmarking practices play specific roles in disseminating and rein-
forcing global policy norms by representing contested images of the world in simplified 
form as expert knowledge. The FDI Index makes foreign investment regulations visible 
as a policy problem and thus amenable to standardized reforms across different national 
contexts. It serves to bolster the OECD’s wider efforts to advocate for the removal of 
foreign investment restrictions via the production of comparative international metrics 
that track deviations from the norm. When domestic policymakers try to convince a 
sceptical public that liberalization is not just wise, but inevitable, because national com-
petitiveness is at stake, they are invoking a particular conception of the economy as the 
ideal. The FDI Index thus presents and promotes a distorted image of the world by label-
ling regulations that might restrict investment as a policy problem — regardless of 
whether they actually restrict FDI flows or how they interact with a government’s other 
social and economic objectives.
IO benchmarking as paradigm maintenance
IO benchmarks make us view and engage with the world on particular terms by influenc-
ing what problems we see in a given policy domain and how we look at them to craft 
political solutions. Benchmarks can therefore misrepresent an issue as a result of con-
struct or content validity problems. Moreover, as the investigation of these two cases has 
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demonstrated, IO benchmarks sanction existing hierarchies in world politics by framing 
contested choices of problem definition and conceptualization as based upon the neutral 
application of rational-scientific expertise. In both cases, the ratings or rankings that are 
obtained in the respective issue areas are presented as objective measures of country 
performance; the benchmarks clearly assign responsibility for success and failure to 
national authorities, rather than to broader socio-political structures and dynamics. 
Furthermore, while the limited number of countries ranked at the top and bottom take the 
limelight, there is little mobility at either end of the comparative performance scales 
produced and promoted by IOs: the best- and worst-performing countries in these two 
benchmarks have remained fairly constant over time (see Tables 2 and 3).
By holding up some states as role models to emulate while framing others as underper-
formers who have to change, IO benchmarks promote images of the world as divided into 
cases of ‘success’ and ‘failure’. By linking the attribution of praise and blame to knowl-
edge-based practices, IO benchmarking specifies ‘what is normal and desirable’ — and, 
by implication, ‘what is abnormal and undesirable behavior’ (Towns, 2012: 180). The 
articulation of superior and inferior qualities in IO benchmarks serves as a mechanism for 
(re)producing social hierarchies among states. At the same time, it locates the causal fac-
tors for country performance at the domestic level, thereby marginalizing sources of struc-
tural power that might be equally responsible for the benchmarked outcomes.
Our empirical illustrations highlight that IO benchmarks focus attention on a limited 
set of data input factors. The simplistic numerical rankings that this process yields risk 
narrowing the scope of political debate down to one-size-fits-all checklists of the techni-
cal adequacy of institutional design, with ticks and crosses (as in the case of the EDB 
ranking) to measure the degree of conformity with what an IO promotes as global ‘best 
practice’. As the preceding discussion shows, the promotion of a specific interpretation 
of highly political concepts through the use of what is perceived as value-neutral factual 
evidence reinforces a set of particularistic values as broadly accepted standards.
IO benchmarking also shapes the ways in which we assign meaning to contested and 
value-laden concepts such as investment restrictions and business regulation. Specifically, 
IO benchmarking practices influence processes of sensemaking by either challenging or 
reinforcing prevalent normative conceptions of problem definition and solution. How an 
issue is articulated and operationalized in IO benchmarks fosters the development of a 
normative consensus on the appropriate scope and targets of political action consistent 
with the agenda and mandate of the organization producing them (Charnysh et al., 2015: 
327–328). The ability of IO benchmarks to shape how actors think about an issue is also 
closely connected to their capacity to influence transnational processes of policy diffu-
sion, whereby knowledge about governance and policy fads travels around the world 
across political settings (Stone, 2004). The available transnational supply of policy les-
sons influences how actors in a specific political domain devise strategic interventions in 
an issue area and what kinds of policy changes are prescribed or discouraged. Global 
benchmarks amplify and reinforce these diffusion mechanisms while limiting the supply 
of alternative policy lessons.
A number of scholars have recently noted a contemporary shift within the global 
development regime away from the transnational paradigm that characterized the 
‘Washington Consensus’ era of the 1980s and 1990s towards a greater focus on ‘best 
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practices’ and ‘measurable results’ (Babb and Chorev, 2016: 94–97; see also Best, 2017; 
Kentikelenis and Seabrooke, 2017). Notwithstanding the importance of these changes, 
our analysis suggests that IO benchmarking techniques enable the core precepts of this 
transnational paradigm to be (re)deployed as quantitative metrics of development pro-
gress. Indeed, many of the controversial free market ideas associated with the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ paradigm continue to be championed both directly and indirectly through IO 
benchmarks. Largely because of the processes of simplification and extrapolation that 
are required to produce comparable aggregate indicators that can be expressed numeri-
cally (Broome and Quirk, 2015a: 827), IO benchmarking remains oriented towards a 
top-down grand vision of development and economic governance even as the same 
organizations may embrace a more decentralized approach in their other activities. In the 
two cases of IO benchmarking that we have examined here, therefore, the EDB ranking 
and the FDI Index serve as mechanisms of paradigm maintenance by other means. Such 
benchmarks increase the staying power of existing paradigms by obscuring specific pol-
icy positions within the application of organizational expertise. In this respect, the EDB 
ranking and the FDI Index are pertinent examples of a wider global governance trend 
towards the cloaking of contested political ideas and normative agendas in the more 
legitimate language of objective performance measurement, numerical indicators and 
peer comparisons.
Overall, our analysis of both cases suggests that the promotion of contested images of 
the world as value-neutral expert knowledge can have far-reaching ramifications when 
these function to focus political attention and to attribute responsibility for outcomes. 
Not only do benchmarks construct images of the world that orient attention towards cer-
tain dimensions of an issue while obscuring others, they also direct towards national 
governments praise for the ‘good’ and blame for the ‘bad’ outcomes showcased by a 
benchmark. When they marginalize or obscure salient factors, or when they misrepresent 
the degree to which national authorities are responsible for performance in a given area, 
benchmarks can significantly distort political debates and policymaking processes. The 
indirect power of IO benchmarking is therefore rooted in its capacity to influence what 
counts as legitimate knowledge, what issues occupy political debates, how to think about 
those issues, what policies are advocated and who is assigned responsibility for suc-
cesses and failures. In short, IO benchmarking contributes to setting the boundaries of 
‘political possibility’ (Holland, 2011) by narrowing the space available for political con-
testation and magnifying the social pressures on states to conform to transnational policy 
paradigms.
Conclusion
The role that IOs play as evaluators of national policy designs, economic performance and 
social outcomes matters. This article has shown that global benchmarking practices by 
IOs create prisms that shape the interpretation of national performance in world politics. 
However, although IOs draw upon their expert status to do so, the benchmarks that they 
produce should not be understood as robust and transparent registers of success and fail-
ure. Rather, our analysis suggests that with these prisms, we see distorted images of how 
different countries compare in terms of their national performance on different political 
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issues within the limitations of a specific transnational policy paradigm. In the two cases 
examined in this article — the World Bank–IFC EDB ranking and the OECD FDI Index 
— the principles underlying the construction of each benchmark are based on pro-market 
(minimal regulation) assumptions about how economic governance ought to work.
For IOs, however, benchmarking is highly appealing. Due to the indirect power of 
comparative performance metrics, benchmarks can augment other avenues through 
which IOs may exercise both direct and indirect power in world politics, such as the 
application of material incentives and loan conditionality or processes of socialization 
and stigmatization. At the same time, it can increase the traction of an IO’s broader 
efforts to shift the parameters within which national elites undertake deliberations, enter 
negotiations, make decisions, formulate goals and order priorities. Perhaps most signifi-
cantly, benchmarking expands the scope of the power of an IO to classify complex politi-
cal, economic and social phenomena, as well as to provide an evidential basis for 
labelling some types of states and governance techniques as ‘best practice’ while delegit-
imizing others. IO benchmarks are thus integral to understanding the complex ways in 
which policy norms and standards that reflect a particular transnational paradigm are 
both legitimated and diffused across political settings.
The (re)production of social hierarchies between states via transnational knowledge 
practices that establish ideal and pathological models of state action is underpinned by an 
appeal to the authority of rational-scientific expertise housed within IOs. While global 
benchmarking practices are often used by civil society organizations to challenge exist-
ing policy paradigms in world politics (Seabrooke and Wigan, 2015), the use of bench-
marks by IOs to rate and rank national performance in the two cases examined here 
serves to maintain a transnational paradigm that is centred on extolling the benefits of 
open markets and is critical of the regulatory role of the state in governing economic 
activity. We have illustrated that benchmarking practices by IOs both configure reputa-
tional incentives for national policymakers to achieve a better score in global ratings and 
rankings, and encapsulate appraisals of national performance within a problematic logic 
of comparison. Yet, national performance in a given issue area is not independent, but, at 
least in part, contingent upon diverging contemporary structural conditions and historical 
legacies of domination. Notions of national success and failure are thus far more relative 
concepts than glossy country rankings imply.
This article has three main implications for future research on the role of IOs as actors 
that exercise expert authority in world politics. First, it points to the importance of further 
investigating the complex linkages that connect different modes of transnational knowl-
edge production with efforts to challenge or maintain dominant paradigms across various 
types of global governance actors. In particular, more research is needed to examine how 
these linkages operate through mechanisms of transnational socialization and stigmatiza-
tion, as well as through transnational evaluation. This agenda for future research includes 
exploring how the production of global performance metrics in one field might influence 
knowledge practices in others, as well as how transnational knowledge is recursively 
deployed across different political settings, and with what effects. Second, future research 
will need to specify the scope conditions under which the knowledge practices of IOs 
enable them to legitimize claims to issue expertise, including how the indirect power of 
benchmarking interconnects with other forms of direct and indirect power. Our discussion 
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in the final section has outlined some of the links that larger empirical studies could inves-
tigate to gain additional insights into the interconnections of power, knowledge and exper-
tise in global governance. Finally, our research suggests that scholars themselves must 
approach global benchmarks with a more critical and sceptical stance on the legitimacy of 
using comparative metrics to construct evidence about comparative national performance 
or to track trends in a particular issue area. Reliance on these problematic tools to con-
struct transnational knowledge distorts how we interpret the world, as well as how we 
seek to change it.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Thomas R. Eimer, Juanita Elias, Jacob Hasselbalch, Joel Quirk, Leonard 
Seabrooke and Matthew Watson, as well as three anonymous reviewers and the EJIR editors, for 
their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article.
Funding
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innova-
tion programme under grant agreement No. 693799 and from the United Kingdom’s Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC) under grant No. ES/K008684/1.
Notes
1. The EDB ranking is a flagship report of the World Bank Group, which comprises five 
IOs. The IFC produces the EDB Report in collaboration with the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association (hereafter 
‘the World Bank’).
2. N = 275 in version 1.9 as of 5 July 2017. Available at: http://warwick.ac.uk/globalbenchmarking/
database
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